The Make-believe Majority Rule

By Sam Onimisi
There are two political doctrines which have prevailed so far in Nigeria, although in their perverted version but which is continually doing damage to the unity of Nigeria or some of its constituent states. They are the concept of majority rule and partisan party loyalty. For this write-up, we shall limit ourselves to a constituent part, using it as a case-study. But let us begin by defining what they mean. Majority rule is “a political principle providing that a majority, usually constituted by fifty percent plus one of an organized group will have the power to make decisions binding upon the whole.” The key point in this definition is: fifty one percent of the whole. Party partisanship or loyalty is “a firm adherent to a party, faction, cause, or person, especially one exhibiting blind, prejudiced, and unreasoning allegiance.” The definitions are not mine but that of Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary and this point is made to exonerate one from charges of bias or even prejudice by some of my readers.
An ‘organized group’ in this case means a political party and not an ethnic group, since the country’s constitution forbids the formation of parties on ethnic basis. It only means that political like-minds irrespective of ethnic affiliation attracted to a party’s manifestoes would vote the same way at all times for the party’s candidates or position. A majority is the largest number of the votes cast in an election, whether it is the nomination process of a party or a general election. Here is where population or numerical strength comes in; the number being that of people of voting age who choose to exercise their franchise.
Again, it should be noted that a group may constitute a majority only when they prove it by the exercise of their voting rights in a particular way. Therefore, there is no permanent ethnic majority in a plural political setting, except if a people choose to firmly adhere to a party or person, especially those ‘exhibiting blind, prejudiced, and unreasoning allegiance.’ Having set the template for this discourse, we can now reveal the specifics of the state in this case study.
Kogi state is made up of Ebira, Igala and Okun ethnic groups as the three major tribal groupings with about eight other smaller ethnic groups. In numerical strength, Igala comes first closely followed by the Ebira and Okun. The ruling party in the state is the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) which has majority adherents in the three senatorial districts. The Igala has ruled the state since 1992 (except during the military regime of Abacha) and the PDP and five other leading parties has again fielded or has nominated their candidates from the Igala ethnic group of Kogi East Senatorial District. So also did about seven other parties, except the SDMP which nominated theirs from Kogi Central and the Convention Peoples Party with its candidate from Kogi West, but whose chances of victory is next to nil, given the relative weakness of their parties in the state. It needs to be recalled that Abubakar Audu ruled the state from 1992 to 1994 and from 1999 to 2003. His fellow Igala tribesman Ibrahim Idris took over in 2003, re-elected in 2007 and had a judicial extension of his tenure which terminates by 2012 – at which time, the Igala would have ruled Kogi State for 15 out of its 20 years in existence as a state.
Can we attribute Igala’s dominance of governance to their numerical strength? My own humble answer is both yes and no, based on the fact that Igalas are found in all parties with some presence in the state, a fact which manifested in 13 out of the 15 parties participating in the next gubernatorial race picking their candidates from among the Igala. Other ethnic groups are also found in other parties as well. Therefore, ethnic numerical strength does not necessarily translate to a party’s political strength, especially where no ethnic group constitute up to 50% of the state. The Igala is known to be about 45% of the population and since their candidates are in 13 parties, their votes will be split and so their numerical strength has little advantage. Can we say that the Igala is more adept in governance than other ethnic groups in the state?
Since there is no basis for comparison, it is out of place to attribute their dominance of governance to adeptness. Until the Ebira, the Okun or any other ethnic group has ruled the state, there is no standard to measure the quality of governance in the state. However, if comparison is made between the Abubakar Audu and the Ibrahim Idris’s regimes, both could be described as a disaster in degrees. While Audu made efforts in infrastructural development, his high hubris and poor public relations was counter-productive and obstructive. As for Ibrahim Idris, we may need to wait for an eleventh hour miracle and since this can happen at anytime in the six months left to his regime, lets not be in hurry to judge him too early. What is obviously going on for the Igala is their power of incumbency which is often deployed to manipulate the primaries of the party in government to produce successors from among the Igala – a practice which some other parties has adopted in the hope and belief that the incumbent Igala governor would manipulate votes in their favour since their candidates are fellow Igala. This hope or belief has worked twice in the past: when there was disagreement within the SDP in 1992 and acrimony in PDP in 1999, the alternatives were the NRC and the ANPP who had Igala candidates and who won by protest votes. But except for blind, prejudiced and unreasoning allegiance to a party, the other ethnic groups in the PDP could as well choose to vote against their own party who would always impose an Igala candidate on them by default or design. As it is at present, if the internal crisis in the PDP is not resolved before the election, Gov. Ibrahim Idris will have no option than allow or help manipulate any of the 13 Igala candidates into power come 2012.
The protest votes that produced Prince Abubakar Audu twice in 1992 and 1999 were not solely Igala votes but the votes of the entire electorate of Kogi State. If other ethnic groups could vote against their party in protest, couldn’t the Igala vote against their own tribesman in favour of candidates from other ethnic groups? From experience of history, political monopoly breeds hatred for the monopolist. A government formed on the basis of a make-belief majority cannot be a legitimate government and would therefore, lack authority to act on behalf of the people. The concept of majority rule in a multi-ethnic state is adherence of the majority to a party and its programmes as contained in its manifesto-not to a tribe. However, if a tribe is bent on monopolizing power and ethno-centric in governance, they should remember that self determination is a universal right of all ethnic nationalities and no one can be forced to remain a subservient citizen in a state that works to diminish their citizenship rights through make-belief majority rule. In other words, if Kogi State is conceived and run as an Igala State, then other ethnic nationalities has the option of opting out of the state, in the exercise of their rights of self-determination and freedom of association-which are even superior to the concept of majority rule. It is even better for the Igala to seek for a state of their own than to rule the multi-ethnic state in perpetuity.
On the other hand, it is not fair to blame the Igala for the inability of the Ebira, Okun and other ethnic groups to organize themselves for the challenges of political power. Except in Nigeria (and has it not failed?), power is not rotated; power is something to be fought for and won. At best, power is devolved so that there is no need for contention among the different nationalities and cultures in a polity. However, to blame other ethnic groups for their apparent weakness in power contest is to misunderstand the issue at stake and add insult to injury. There was no known agreement or terms for co-habitation for the diverse ethnic groups in Kogi State or even the entire country as a whole. Kogi State and Nigeria came into being by military fiat. A state that was created on the basis of presumptions can never be stable, just and fair, or progressive. The nature of politics and power demands that consenting peoples must have a written agreement spelling out the terms of co-habitation, the breach of which terminates the agreement or dissolves the union. The absence of a binding constitution on the state and the imposition of a constitution on Nigerians is one principal reason for the lack of equity and fairness in our affairs. If Kogi State or Nigeria proceeds or continues with the present presumptions, power monopoly through manipulations will continue to be our lot- and the outcome will remain a make-believe majority rule. Well, if this will water the seed of the quest for self-determination, why not?